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CAPITALCONTROLS NID C)ERED INTEREST PARITY
ABSTRACT
Thispaper examinescoveredinterest parity between Yen—denominated and
dollar—denominated assets: Euro—yen and Euro—dollar three month deposit rates,
and the representative and comparable three—month interest rates in Japan and
in the U.S.An objective of this paper is to single out the portion of
deviations from covered interest parity that is caused by capital controls
Imposed by the Japanese authority.To that end, new measures of one—way
arbitrage gain are defined taking Into account transactions costs associated
with the bid—ask spread of exchange rates and the transactions tax on
repurchase agreements, Gensaki,in Japan. According to our measure, covered
interest parity has been holding, as theory predicts, in the Euro market since
1977.The Euro—Yen market must have been thin to have caused violations to
parity in 1975 and 1976.Capital controls imposed by the Japanese Government
are detected by one—way arbitrage measures between l3ensaki in Japan and Euro-
Dollar deposits between 1975 and 1980.After a new law was enacted in
December 1980 which lifted most capital controls, covered interest parity has
been holding between Gensaki and dollar—denominated assets.
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Covered interest arbitrage must equaHze net yields of assets denominated
in different currencies taking inte account the currency appreciation (or
depreciation) expressed in the forward—spot spread.Since simultaneous
transactions in the spot and forward markets eliminate any risks in the
exchange rate fluctuations, covered interest parity is expected to hold in a
theoretical model with perfect capital mobility all the time.However, it is
not so straightforward to establish covered interest parity empirically.1
Deviations observed in data can be attributed to one of the following reasons:
(I) transactions costs associated with information gathering and processing,
brokerage fees and commissions, and taxes on transactions;(ii)differences
in treatment of income taxes on yields from assets in different currency
denominations; (iii)capitalcontrols in place on movement of short—term
investments;(iv) default risk of an asset and political (country) risk of
future capita) controls; and (v) errors in (observed) variables.
An objective of this paper is to single out the portion of deviations
from covered interest parity that is caused by capital controls imposed by the
Japanese authority.To that end, data are carefully selected to avoid the
problem of timing and errors in observat4ons.Monthly data are cross—checked
with daily data, when possible, in order to make sure that they are on the
end of months basis.Transactions costs associated with the bid—ask spread
and the transactions tax on repurchase agreements in Japan are taken into
account.2Political risks due to the fear of future capital controls are
discussed but not explicitly analyzed in this paper.This is not a serious
problem, because the capital controls of Japan in the 1970's are being lifted
one by one as explained in the next section.3Thus, we interpret any
significant deviations fromparityas evident that capital controls already in
place became binding.
ICovered interest parity is examined for various pairs of on—shore and
off—shore assets denominated in Yen and in U.S. dollars:Euro—Yen and Euro-
Dollar three month deposit rates and the representative and comparable three—
month interest rates In Japan and in the U.S.In section 3, we define and
examine these measures of arbitrage gains in the traditional way, without
taking into account transactions costs.Section 4 is devoted to developing
new measures of one—way arbitrage gains net of transactions costs consisting
of the bid—ask spread of exchange rates and the transact ions tax.Positive
entries of a measure are interpreted as deviations from parity due to capital
controls.The measure which takes into account transactions costs in one
direction is related to the theoretical concept of TMone—way arbitrage in
Deardorff (1979).
A few conments on closely related works are in order.Otani and Tiwarl
(1981) and OtanI (1982) examined capital controls and covered Interest parity
between Yen—denominated and dollar—denominated assets.Both works used daily
data from 1978 to March 1981.They examined the difference between three—
month Gensaki, which are repurchase agreements in Japan, and three—month Euro—
Yen deposit rates. They found that the Gensaki rate was higher than the Euro—
Yen rate from the beginning of 1978 to March of 1979, and that the reverse was
true in the first quarter of 1980.The authors explained these deviations by
episodes of capital controls by the Japanese Government.There are several
differences between their papers and this one.First, by using monthly data
we have documented a longer time series by various measures for apparent
arbitrage gains from 1975 to April 1983 (and in the case of TEGATA, the Bill
Discount rate, from 1972 to 1982).Second, taking into account the bid—ask
spread of exchange rates and transaction taxes on Gensaki arrangements, we
created a measure which picks up the deviation 4rom parity due to capital
controls net of obvious transactions costs.4
2II, A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPANESE CAPITAL CONTROLS
Deregulationof Japanese capital controls came in several steps during
the 1970's and was completed by the new Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law in December 1980.Before 1974, most short—term capital flows in
and out of Japan were in general restricted.No Japanese security companies
could buy foreign bonds, and no foreign companies could buyJapanese
securities. However, subsequent fluctuations in the Yen were accompanied by
deregulation of capital controls.When the Yen was depreciating quickly,
deregulation to encourage inflows of capital took place, and when the Yen was
rapidly appreciating, deregulation to encourage outflows of capitalwas
introduced.5 For example, in the wak. of Yendepreciation, short—term
government securities became available to non—residentsin August 1974,
although their interest rate was (and still is) fixed at a levellower than
the market rate. In an attempt to stop a long process of Yen appreciation in
1977, Japanese security firms and others (with security firms' intermediation)
were allowed acquire foreign securities.After hitting an all—time high in
late 1978, the Yen depreciated rapidly in 1979. In that year,it became
possible for foreign companies to purchase any Japanese securities in February
and to trade repurchase agreements in May.In December 1980, the new law
became effective. Under the new law, capital flows in and out of Japan are
free with a few exceptions.6 Investing in foreign securities is allowed to
anybody without a security firm's intermediation;foreign loans need only
prior reporting; non—residents can purchase and sell Japanese securities
without any licensing; non-residents can issue bonds in Japan with prior
reporting; and Japanese residents can open deposit accounts denominated in
foreign currencies with market—determined interest rates.
The series of important deregulations mentioned above is expected to make
3conditions of covered interest parity involving the Tokyomarket (GAIN
measures2, 4, and 5, which will be defined in thenext section)show a
convergence toward zero.Considering the capital controls in place before
1974,it would not be surprising to find unexploited profit opportunities
before 1974. The band of deviations from parity shoulddiminish between 1974
and 1980, and should be at a minimum after 1980. Since theU.S. did not have
notable capital controls after the 1970's, any arbitrageGAIN measures
involving the U.S. market should not show much deviation.The interest parity
in the Euro market (GAIN 1) should provide a benchmark forhow much deviation
is mnormal.NWhen we consider the bid-ask spread to single outdeviations
caused by capital controls, one—way arbitrage gainsshould not be observed
after December 1980 One can ask the question whether the new law has
actually made any differences.It may have been the case that deregulation
for the Japanese investors in 1977 and for the non—residentsin 1979 was
significant enough so that parity was already holdingat the time the new law
was introduced; or perhaps the new law only paid lipservice to deregulation
and included sonic unwritten barriers.The following sections of this paper
will confirm or refute the above conjectures and answerthe above—mentiOned
quest ion.
III. ARBITRAGE GAINSi A TRADITI0WL.APPRCH
Several measures of hypothetical arbitrage gains aredefined between
EUROY, the three—month Euro—Yen deposit rate in London;EUROD, the three-
month Euro—Dollar deposit rate in London;RJA, the three—month repurchase
agreement (Gensaki) rate inTokyo;and RUS, the prime industrial paper rate in
the U.S.7Measures GAINI through GAIN4 represent net arbitrage gainsby






where F is the three—month 4.rward exchange rate measured in Yen per dollar;
Sis the spot exchange rate measured in Yen per dollar; R$ is the interest
rate on the dollar—denominated asset,i.e., EUROD or RUS; RY is the interest
rate for a Yen—denominated asset, i.e., EUROY or RJA. For
1, 2, 3, 4,
we substitute
EUROD, EUROD, RUS, RUS,
RY =EUROY,RJA,EUROY, RJA,
respectively.Note that all the GAIN measures in this paper are expressed in
simple annual yields.
Covered interest parity is supposed to hold almost by definition in the
Euro currency market.The transactions costs are minimal and there is little
time lag in trading and recording.The Interbank deposits in different
currencies bear similar and comparable risks.As the Euro—Yen market has
become more active, covered interest parity should be confirmed by data
without even minor exceptions.One source of deviations may be observation
errors of exchange rates and timing of measurements.On the other hand,
covered arbitrage operations from assets in Tokyo to Euro—dollar deposits or
vice versa may be subject to various kinds of capital controls of the Japanese
Government.Therefore, GAIN2 would measure deviations from parity due to
capital controls.There is another way of looking at this effect. Taking the
difference between GAIN2 and GAIN1, we have another measure of deviation
associated with capital controls.
GAINS EGAIN2-GAIN!
=EUROY-RJA
5On the one hand, GAINSis betterthan GAIN2 as a measure ofcapitalcontrols
if there are substantial transactions costs with respectto spot and forward
foreign exchange, and also if there are measurement errorsin exchange rates.8
On the other hand, GAIN2 would represent deviationsdue to capital controls
more accurately than GAIN5 if the Euro—Yenmarket is not well developed.The
mere fact that the Euro—Yen deposit rate wasnot available before 1975
suggests that it might be only recently thatGAIN5 hasbecome a reliable
measure. We will consider both GAIN2 and GAINSascandidates for a measure of
capital controls. Similarly, a measure of the U.S.capital controls iscreated
by taking the difference between GAIN3 and GAINI:
GAIN6 m GAINI -GAIN3
=EUROD-RUS
In the existing literature, some of the above measures areused to show or to
refute covered interest parity.Either positive or negative entries mean
violations to covered interestparitx In the strict sense.However, parity is
said to be holding if the deviation is within a TMbandof neutrality.w Itis
an immediate question of what determines thisband. A relationship between
the above measures of qains from arbitrage isschematically explained in
Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Summary statistics of each gain measure are presentedIn Table 1.Since
the capital controls in Japan were significantlyrelaxed in December 1980,
statistics are calculated for sub—periods before andafter December 1980 as
well as for the entire period from 1975 to 1983.
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE
Since transactions costs are minimal and there are no capital controlsin the
6Euro markets, large deviations from par it>' in measure GAIN! are due to a thin
market or observational errors. Variability represented by standard deviations
of GAIN! is reduced after December 1980 to a level less than a half of what it
was between 1975 and December 1980.This may be due to the increase in
capital flows after the 1980 deregulation and the resulting expansion of the
Euro—Yen market. Compared to the decrease in variability of GAIN1, changes in
standard deviations of GAIN2 and GAIN5 over the two sub—periods are drastic:
they are reduced by 90 '..Forthe period after December 1980, standard
deviations of GAIN2 and GAIN! are very close to 0.25, and those of GAIN3 and
OAJN4 are equal at 0.466.This suggests that deviations from parity were
because of capital controls before the new law came into effect in December
1980.However, parity has been holding closely since 1981.The large
standard deviations of GA1N2 and GAIN5 before December 1980 do not tell us
which way the deviations were directed.Means of GAIN measures 2 through 5
show that investing in Yen—denominated assets were on average more profitable
than otherwise by a slight margin, but standard deviations are too large to
conclude this with confidence. A plot of a gain measure should be examined to
determine whether deviations from parity are Just random or are serially
correlated. Figure 2 shows how GAINS changes over time.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Most of the time before the middle of 1979, deviations from parity were
in a direction such that there were potential arbitrage gains toward Yen—
denominated assets.That was particularly true in the beginning of 1975 and
in all of1978. As explained in section 2, the purchase of Gensaki was
allowed in May 1979, and other restrictions were lifted in December 1980. It
can be seen from Figure 2 and Table I that these deregulations seems to have
established covered interest parity between Gensaki and dollar—denominated
7assets. However, this remains *conjectureuntil we separate deviations
due to capital controls from those due to transactions costs In the next
section, we will propose new measure of 'one—way arbitrage gain which is more
explicit than the idea of a band of neutrality.
IV. ARBITRAGE GAINS DUE TO CAPITAL CONTROLS
In this section, we define measures for arbitrage gain taking into
account explicitly the bid—ask spread for the exchange rates and the
transactions tax for the Gensaki asset. The exchange rate available to a
seller of Yen is not the same as the one to a buyer.Therefore, a measure of
interest arbitrage gain should involve different exchange rates depending on
the direction of a flowoffunds.Covered interest parity implies that there
are no gains of arbitrage in either direction, which showupas non—positive
entries for the two one—way gain measures involving the same assets.The
transactions tax for Gensaki depends on the instrument and on who is trading.
The loss on the annualized yield of Gensaki arrangements between a security
company and a client with Government bonds as an instrument is estimated to be
0.16 X, as explained in Ito (1983).Therefore, the yield for RJA should be
reduced by 0.16.
Let us denote the ask rate of spot and forward exchange rates by GA and
FA, respectively. Then our new measures of arbitrage gains are defined in two
directions.The arbitrage gain of a dollar—denominated asset over Yen—
denominated asset has a suffix A after the number of the gain measure, and
a gain measure in the reverse direction has a suffix B:
FA





where for N 1, 2, 3, 4
we substitute
=EUROD,EUROD, RUB,RUS
RYEUROY, RJA—0.16, EUROY, RJA-0.16.
For example, GAIN2B measures whether an economic agent in the Euro market
currently holding three—month Euro—dollar deposits would rather invest in
three—month Gensaki in Tokyo.Since GAINS and GAIN6 are gain measures which
do not involve transactions costs of foreign exchange, they are the same as in
the last section. One—way1 covered interest parity implies that any GAIN
measure should be non—positive all the time.9 Summary statistics of one—way
GAIN measures are presented in TABLE 2.The asset originally held is
described in each row.Analternative asset by covered arbitrage operations
isdescribed in eachcolumn.In each box are means and standard deviations
for the periods before and after the new law of 1980.Theory predicts that a
gain measure is non—positive not only on average but also in each entry.
TABLE 3 lists the number of positive entries for eachseries in eachyear
after 1975.
INSERT TABLES 2 N'ID 3 ABOUT HERE
Itis just as theory predicts that two one—way' gain measures in the
Euro—market, GAINIA and GAINIB,staynegative after 1977 with few exceptions.
The means of these measures, therefore, are negative. Standard deviations
become smaller, indicating that any factors affecting covered interest parity
have become stable.For example, transactions costs other than the bid—ask
spread have become uniform for all participants in the Euro—Yen market due to
9the market's expansion.Major violations to parity and a large swing In 1976
suggest that the Euro Yen market was thin at that time.
Gain measures between Euro—Dollars and Gensaki, GIN2A and GAIN2B,showa
different picture.The number of positive entries and means of GAIN2B before
1979 suggest that there were substantial unexploited profit opportunities from
the Euro market toward the Gensaki asset.This was due to the capital
controlsin place then in Japan, in particular a barrier to inflows of
capital.As explained in section 2, purchase of Gensaki by non—residents was
prohibited until May 1979.Non—residents could only invest in other
securities, such as treasury bills, which had interest rates afixedlower
than the Gensaki rate before May 1979; the Gensaki market had been the only
open market with a flexible interest rate.1°Therefore, potential profit
opportunitiesshown above reflect both capital controls in termsof
prohibiting non—residents from purchasing Gensaki and the low interest rate
policy affecting yields on alternative assets.Positive entries of GAIN2A
persisted until the end of 1980.This suggests that deregulation of outflows
of capital in 1977 was not enough to •stablish parity, and that it was the new
law of 1980 which made parity hold.In order to see how lifting the capital
controls affected the measure, GAIN2A and GAIN2B are plotted in Figure 2. The
declinein standard deviations and non—positive movements of both lIN2A and
IN2B after 1980 are seen in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Unlike the success in measuring deviations from parity associated with
capital controls of Japan, gain measures involving nerican domestic assets do
not behave as theory predicts.Violations to covered interest parity are
evident in GAIN3B and 1N4B;U.S. asset holders would have been better off
investing in Euro—Yen or Gensaki, according to these numbers.There are two
10possible reasons for this anomaly. First, prime industrial paper In the U.S.,
used for the representative short—term interest rate in the Morgan Guarantee
data bank, may not be the appropriate domestic instrument for studying covered
interest arbitrage.However, the Gensaki rate, which is listed as the
representative short—term rate in the same source, is appropriate for Japan.
Second, additional transactions costs or default risk in connection with
international debt crisis may be responsible for the deviations. See Kreicher
(1982) for discussion of default risk and balance sheet constraints to explain
apparent deviations in the GAIN6 measure using the CD rate as domestic
interest rate.
V.EXTENSIONSOF THELYSIS
In this section, we extend our analysis fromprevioussections in two
directions.First, we would like to confirm that the new measures of one-way
arbitrage gains are useful in daily data, too.Since the measures developed
in the preceding section predict non—positive entries all the time, covered
interest arbitrage is tested better in finer frequencies.Second, the sample
period is extended to include the early 70's.Between 1971 and 1974, Just
after the demise of the Bretton—Woods regime, the Japanese government tried to
avoid a rapid appreciation of Yen and kept strong capital controls. It is of
great interest to see whether covered interect oroitrage was holding during
these turbulent years.
V.1 Arbitrage Gain Measures with Daily Data
Daily (weekdays excluding bank holidays) data are available to calculate
GAINIA and GAIN1B after 1978. The number of violations to parity,i.e.,
positive entries, and means and standard deviations of GAIN1A and GAIN1B are
11
reported in the first two columns of Table 4.
11INSERT TABLE 4
Examining the table and figures, we realize that although all reported
means. are negative, one of the two GAIN measures has more than one-tenth of
its entries violating parity every year between 1978 and 1982. However,
standard deviations have been decreasing so that in the first half of 1983
there are no violations to parity. Since the Euro market has expanded, the
covered interest parity between the Euro Yen and Dollar markets is now holding
as theory predicts.This is shown In the non—positive one—way arbitrage gain
measures.Plots of daily data are available in Ito (1983) for GAIN1A and
GAINIB and in Otani (1982) for Gensaki and EUROY showing GAIN5 as their
differences.
One may propose to consider a variant of the one—way arbitrage gain. In
addition to using the bid—ask spread for the exchange rates, the bid—ask
spread for three—month deposit rates could be used.Consider an arbitrage
operation of borrowing the Euro—Yen at the ask rate and investing in the Euro-
Dollar at the bid rate. The GAINIA measure is modified by replacing the Euro—
yen and Euro—dollar rates when used as the origins of arbitrage by their ask
rates denoted by EIJROYA and EURODA, respectively.Krelcher (1982) used the
bid—ask spead of Euro—Dollar deposit rates in his calculation of one-way
arbitrage gains between the Euro—Dollar and CD rates in the U.S., which are






GAIN1BB =(1s EUROY) —- (I+EURODA>
F
12The number of violations to parity and means and standard deviations of these
modified GAIN measures are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 4.
According to the modified measures, covered interest arbitrage has been
holding more than 95 > of the time since 1981, and the accuracy is improving
over time.One problem with these measures is that since the mean is
significantly different fromzero,the modified measurE is probably too strong
in the sense that the marginal arbitrageurs in the market are not agents who
issue th. deposit certificates.
V.2 Experience in the Early 1970's
Th. end—of—month Gensaki series dates back only to 1975.In order to
investigate covered interest parity during the turbulent years of the early
1970's, a substitute for the Gensaki rate Is sought.A natural candidate is
the (interbank) Bill Discount ('Tegata') rate with a maturity of two to three
months.12The Tegata rate differs from the Gensaki rate in three respects
(i) the series is taken as 'average over the month' as opposed to the 'end of
the month';(ii) the interbank market is closed to nonresident investors
(except foreign banks); (iii) the maturity of the instrument is classified as
'two to three months' (and it is 'two manths since October 1980). With these
changes in mind, let us construct the modified gain measures, GAIN2T and
GAIN4T, replacing RJA (Gensaki) by TEGATA in the definitions of GAIN2 and
GAIN4, respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the fluctuations in GAIN2T between
1972 and 1982;and GAIN4T which is not shown here looks very similar to
GAIN2T.How closely the Tegata rate is related to the Gensaki rate can be
understood by comparing movements of GAIN2 and GAIN2T between 1975 and 1982.
The modified series is quite comparable with the original series for that
period in terms of direction of movements and the amplitude of fluctuations.
13INSERT FIGURE 4
Let us focus on the modified measure between 1972 and 1974.This period
ischaracterizedby fluctuations with amplitudes much wider than in later
periods.For example, in December 1973, GAIN2T became 30X.In that month
Tegata was 11.192Y. and EUROD was 10.13 X, while the spot rate was Y280/$ and
the forward rate was Y320/$.This is in contrast to the case in February
1973, when GAIN2T was belv —lOX, The Japanese interest rates were determined
quite independently fromtheforward premium (expected depreciation ofYen,
I..., S < F) and the Euro—dollar interest rate. Most of thes. fluctuations in
GAIN2T can be attributed to the fluctuations In the forward premium or
discount, with comparable Interest rates. These are sufficient evidence that
in the early 1970's, the Japanese capital market was isolated fromtherest of
the world, as conjectured in Section 2. Any unexploited gains from arbitrage
in these periods were due to capital controls which made Japanese instruments
unavailable to non—residents and placed strong restrictions on the acquisition
offoreignsecurities by the Japanese.
VI, CONCLUDING REIiRKS
This paper examines covered interest parity between Yen—denominated and
dollar—denominated assets.We propose a measure of one—way arbitrage gain
which singles out the deviations from parity due to capital controls.
According to our measure, covered interest parity has been holding, as theory
predicts, in the Euro market since 1977.The Euro—Yen market must have been
thin to have caused violations to parity in 1975 and 1976.SInce 1977, the
standard deviations of the measure have been reduced gradually.This is
14confirmed in daily data as well as monthly data.
In order to consider capital controls imposed by the Japanese Government,
measures of one—way arbitrage gains between the Gensaki and Euro—dollar assets
are examined from 1975 to 1983.The measure shows apparent unexploited
arbitrag. gains between 1975 and 1978.In particular, strong arbitrage gains
existed in 1978 in the direction from Euro—Dollars to Sensaki. This is caused
both by capital controls, in that non—residents were not allowed to purchase
Gensaki, and by the low interest rate policy, in that assets available to non—
residents had interest rates lower than the market (Gensaki) rate.After
Gensaki became available to non—residents in May 1979 and the new Foreign
Exchange Law became effective in December 1980, one—way arbitrage gains have
almost disappeared, showing that these institutional changes were successful
in establishing smooth short—term capital flows in and out of Japan.
Using the Tegata rate, a measure of arbitrage gain is extended back to
1972. The large fluctuations of the measure from 1973 to 1974 are due to very
strict capital controls before 1974.
To sum up, we found in this paper that Japanese capital controls in place
caused deviations from covered interest parity during 1972 to 1979.Gradual
deregulation of capital controls from 1975 to 1980 contributed to smaller
standard deviations in measures of arbitrage gains. Allowing non—residents to
purchase Gensaki in May 1979 and the across—the—board deregulation of capital
flows in December 1980 made significant changes in the behavior of measures of
one—way arbitrage gains. Since January 1981, we have seldom observed positive
unexploited arbitrage left in the market.
15FOOTNOTES
1. See Aliber (1973) for classifying different reasons for deviations from
covered interest rate parity; these are reproduced below with modifications.
Frenkel and Levich (1975,1977, 1981) measured transactions costs by
triangular arbitrage between different currencies. Frank.'l (1982) and Claasen
and Wyplosz (1982) focused on the Franc with an emphasis on political risks
and Otani and Tiwari (1981) and Otani (1982) demonstrated deviations from
parity involving the Yencausedby capital controls for 1978—1982. Dooley and
Isard (1980) explained deviations in foreign and domestic Mark—based interest
rates by variables associated with political risks.
2.This paper ignores deviations due to differences in taxation of corporate
Income from different sources.Makin (1983) discusses the issue in a
theoretical model but he considers purchasing power parity rather than covered
interest parity.
3. The Japanese deregulation of capital controls is in contrast to that in
France which is described in Frankel (1982).Strictly speaking, we cannot
reject an alternative interpretation that the deviations result 4rom the
combination of capital controls already in place with a fear of the imposition
of additional capital controls.
4. Otani and Tiwari (1981) use a definition of transactions costs which Is
broader than ours. Their transactions costs Include 'not only brokerage fees
but also costs in terms of taxes, search time, political risks, and ways in
which market participants need to maneuver around any capital controls.'
5. However, there were a few occasions when controls were tightend, only to
be deregulated shortly. See Otani (1981; Appendix) for details.
FOOTNOTES-i6.The law specifies various conditions under which controls can be
reimposed: a dangerously unstable Yen; a threat to domestic capital markets,
monetary policy, or balance of payments; a substantial threat to a domestic
industry; or the inability of Japan to meet international agreements.
7. See appendices for the reasons we select these data and sources and
definitions of data.
8. Most of the studies of interest rate parity use the difference between
the on—shore and off—shore interest rates.Otani and Tiwari (1981) compared
Euro—Yen and Gensaki rates Claassen and Wyplosz (1982) studied the
difference between the domestic Franc and Euro—Franc rates. It was the German
Mark inFrankfurtand Zurich on which Dooley and Isard (1980) focused.
9. Although the name of 'one—way arbitrage is adopted from Deardorff, our
definition is slightly different fromhis.We mean by one—way arbitrage a
one—directional arbitrage between three—month assets denominated in home
currency and an a set of operations consisting of selling home currency in the
spot market, investing in foreign assets, and buying home currency in the
forward market.Deardorff considered an arbitrage between buyingforeign
currency in the spot market and a set of operations consisting of investing
(lending) In an asset denominated in home currency, selling home currency in
the forward market, and selling short (borrowing) a foreign asset. Since both
usages express the same phenomenon, cov•red interest arbitrage, our modified
usage is appropriate.
10.For details, see Ito (1983).
FOOTNOTES—211.Observations which produce gain measures with more than 10 standard
deviations from the mean of the respective sub—period are trimmed. They are
1977i189, 19827O, and 1983115, where th. dates are the number of weekdays.
12.See Ito (1983) for the reason why the treasury bifl rate (In Japan)
cannot serve for the purpose here, and for characteristics of the BIH
Discount rate, including a figure which Illustrates how closely the Bill









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GAINI GAIN2 GAN3 GAIN4 GAINS G1.*16
75:1 — 83:4
AVERAGE 0.182 —0.635 -0.506 —1.323 —0.817 0.688
(ST1D.0EV) (0.574) (1.764)(0.766) (1.709) (1.720) (0.444)
75:1- 80:12
AVERAGE 0.281 —0.906 —0.352 —1.539 —1.187 0.633
(ST1D. 0EV) (0.631) (2.009) (0.803) (1.951) (1.899) (0.442)
81:1 —83:4
AVERAGE -0.073 0.062 -0.904 -0.768 0.135 0.831
(ST4D. 0EV) (0.253) (0.245) <0.466)(0.466) (0.179) (0.414)
TABLE—iTABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations of sOne_WaYN Arbitrage Gain Measures
Each box consists of mean and standard deviations in brackets of a 1N















































Numbers of Positive Entries of 'One—Way' Arbitrage Gain Measures
Gaintleaure IA lB 2A 20 3A 38 4A 4B
75:1— 75:12 8 4 1 11 1 11 1 11
76:1 — 76:12II 1 4 6 8 4 3 9
77i1 — 77:12 3 0 0 9 2 4 0 11
78:1 — 78:12 1 0 0 12 0 8 0 12
79:1—79:12 0 0 6 2 0 10 1 5
80:1—80:12 2 0 9 0 0 10 2 5
81:1—81:12 0 3 0 0 0 10 0 8
82:1 —82:12 0 1 3 0 0 11 0 9
83:1—83:4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
TABLE-3TABLE 4











1978—1983 —0.41 -0.52 —0.40 —0.68
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42)
SUB—PER I ODS
1978—1980 —0.31 —0.48 —0.66 —0.61
(0.45) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48)
1981—1983 —0.52 -0.30 —0.70 —0.43































Thefollwng data areprovided by courtesy of Data Resources Inc. (DRI) and
Morgan Guarantee Trust (MG).
EURO?. EURODI RUS
Daily series by DRI: Monthly series by MG, World Financial Markets, with
with additional observations of EURO? fromitsdata bank.
Monthly series by MG, data bank.<Note that the series published in
World Financial Markets has a discontinuity over the datasource, which
has to be corrected. SeeIto(1983) for details.)
S. F
Daily series by DRI:Monthly series between 71:8 and 76:12 fromIMF
(aeC158 and bC158), and between 77:1 and 83:4 constructed fromDRI
daily series by picking the last business day of each month.
SA FA
Daily series by DRI: Monthly series between 77:1 and 83:4 from DRI daily
series by picking the last business day of each month, and between 75:1
to 76:12 by regressing SA (FA) on constant, time and S (F) and then
estimating SA (FA) by extrapolation.
Further notes on the data are inorder.First, itis difficult to find an
alternative source for the Gensaki rate with a maturity of three months.A
series for Oensaki in OECD, Main Economic Indicators, is unfortunately notan
send of month series, contrary to Its caption.The end—of—month series for
three—month GensakiIs available from Bank of Japan,Annual Economic
Statistics, only after 1977. Themonthly data weused were cross—checked
APPENDIX1against daily series published in newspapers in Japanfor 1980—82 without
detecting any major deviations.
Second, an alternative interest rate in Japan is notavailable.The
Tegata rate as explained in section .)I is an interbankrate.However, the
series for a two—month instrument is available only as daily averagesand has
been regulated in a sense until 1979.The CD rate, which is free from
regulation, Is available only since May 1979.The treasury bill rate with a
maturity of 60 days is heavily regulated.It is well below the official
discount rate and the rate Ii changed only when the officialdiscount rate is
changed.Most of the treasury bills are simply bought out bythe Bank of
Japan and do not circulate in the open market.Since the treasury bill rate
in Japan does not represent th. short—term moneymarket rate, it is
inappropriate to use it in a study of covered interestrate parity such as one
by Frenkel and Levich <1981). For a detailed descriptionof interest rates in
Japan, seeIto(1983).
Third, we decided not to use the IMF monthly seriesof exchange rates
because cross—checking with daily data
the IMF series failed to picK up the last business dayof the
IMF series deviates from ours by about 2 Yen perdollar for the
rates in April 1979 and January 1982, partly becauseof high
the rate toward the ends of those months.Using IMF data would
diminishing standard deviations of the gain measure evenbetween
and Euro—dollar rates.
the Euro deposit rates provided by MG are cross—checked against
daily series available from DRI.Th. discrepancx is minimal and th. problem
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